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Notes and Comments
Untangling the Public Duty Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
Rhode Island's public duty doctrine provides tort immunity
for the state and its political subdivisions.' Under the public duty
doctrine, as a general matter, when the state engages in govern-
mental functions, as distinguished from proprietary functions, it is
immune from tort liability.2 There are, however, two exceptions:
the special duty exception 3 and the egregious conduct exception.
4
The special duty exception provides that the state may be held li-
able if it owed a duty to the individual plaintiff, as opposed to the
general public.5 The egregious conduct exception provides that the
state may be held liable if it had "knowledge that it [had] ... cre-
ated a situation that force[d] an individual into a position of peril
and subsequently [chose] not to remedy the situation."6 Although
designed to ensure the effective administration of government, the
public duty doctrine is no longer capable of doing so.
The purpose of governmental tort immunity is to strike a bal-
ance between two competing objectives: (1) allowing plaintiffs to
recover for injuries caused by the state's tortious conduct; and (2)
ensuring the "effective administration" 7 of government by protect-
1. Hereinafter "the state and its political subdivisions" is referred to
simply as "the state."
2. E.g., O'Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 337 (R.I. 1989); see also infra
Part II.C.2.
3. E.g., Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545, 548 (R.I. 1984).
4. E.g., Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67 (R.I. 1991).
5. Orzechowski, 485 A.2d at 548-49.
6. E.g., Verity, 585 A.2d at 67.
7. E.g., Catone, 555 A.2d at 333.
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ing the state from liability for its discretionary, policy-making ac-
tivities.8 Rhode Island's public duty doctrine, however, disrupts
this balance by allowing plaintiffs to recover regardless of whether
the conduct in question is discretionary or policy driven. This is
because the egregious conduct exception, despite its misleading
label, has been inconsistently applied to require no more than is
necessary to make out a standard negligence claim, thereby effec-
tively rendering the public duty doctrine meaningless.
Adding to the doctrine's confusion and inconsistency is the re-
quirement that the state's governmental and proprietary activities
be distinguished - the doctrine and its exceptions applying in
cases of the former, and ordinary negligence principles applying in
cases of the latter. As a threshold matter to the doctrine's applica-
tion, the distinction produces inconsistent, and therefore unpre-
dictable and inequitable results, as the plaintiff who fails to
characterize the state's activity as proprietary is left to convince
the court that his case falls under one of the doctrine's exceptions.
This Comment addresses these inconsistencies and provides
alternatives that will restore the original purpose of the public
duty doctrine.9 Part II discusses the evolution of governmental
tort immunity in Rhode Island from sovereign immunity and its
abrogation to the public duty doctrine and its exceptions. Part III
argues that the public duty doctrine no longer serves the purpose
for which it was originally created because, despite its name, the
egregious conduct exception requires no more than a showing of
ordinary negligence. Part IV explores alternatives to the public
duty doctrine, which include a renewed emphasis on personal im-
munities and the adoption of a rule of immunity based solely upon
the state's discretionary, policy-making decisions. These alterna-
tives will better accomplish the goals for which the public duty
doctrine was created, as well as provide greater consistency and
predictability within the field.
8. See, e.g., Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 354-55 (R.I.
1978).
9. It should be noted at the outset that the scope of this Comment is in-
tended to go beyond simply addressing the various criticisms of the egregious
conduct exception. "'To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque struc-
ture is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse inter-
ests than to establish a rational edifice.'" Cf Tedesco v. Connors, No. 03-4692005 WL 955030, at *7 (R.I. Apr. 27, 2005) (quoting Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948)).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF RHODE ISLAND'S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
A. Sovereign Immunity
Before falling out of favor, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was the majority rule in the United States.10 It is generally ac-
cepted that the doctrine originated in England from the self-
preserving monarchial idea that "the king can do no wrong," itself
adopted from the Romans." The notion manifested itself at Eng-
lish common-law in Russell v. Men of Devon,12 upon the rationale
that "'an infinity of actions' would arise and that 'it is better that
an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should
suffer an inconvenience." ' 13 From England the doctrine was ex-
ported to the United States where it was accepted by reasoning
that "there can be no legal right against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends."'
4
Sovereign immunity first appeared in Rhode Island in Wixon
v. City of Newport,'5 where the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
a municipality immune for the actions of its employees who were
engaged in a governmental function, defined by the Court as a
matter in which the defendant municipality had "no private or
corporate interest."' 6 Thus began the practice of distinguishing be-
tween the state's governmental and proprietary functions to pro-
tect the state's financial resources in cases of the former, and
ameliorate the harsh effects of immunity in cases of the latter.
This distinction "led at worst to innumerable injustices and at best
to a plethora of legislative and judicial exemptions," 7 eventually
leading to the downfall of sovereign immunity in Rhode Island.
10. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
53.02.10 (3d ed. 2003).
11. MCQUILLIN, supra note 10, at § 53.02.10; Calhoun v. City of Provi-
dence, 390 A.2d 350, 353 (R.I. 1978).
12. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
13. Calhoun, 390 A.2d at 353 (quoting Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362).
14. McQUILLIN, supra note 10, at § 53.02.10 (quoting Kawanabajia v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907)).
15. 13 R.I. 454 (1881).
16. Id. at 459.
17. Calhoun, 390 A.2d at 354.
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B. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
In Becker v. Beaudoin,18 the supreme court abolished sover-
eign immunity as it applied to municipalities.19 Consequently, any
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions
would no longer be recognized. 20 The court, however, did not in-
tend to strip the state's municipalities of every protection from li-
ability, holding that for "discretionary... [] judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or quasi-legislative" activities the state's mu-
nicipalities would continue to be immune from liability.21 Addi-
tionally, the court preserved sovereign immunity for the state
itself.22 Finally, the court noted that its holding would be "sub-ject.., to any legislation which has been or may be enacted by the
general assembly limiting or regulating... such claims."23 In re-
sponse to the court's invitation to legislate, the General Assembly
shortly thereafter enacted section 9-31-1 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, 24 which not only codified the court's holding in Becker,
but also expanded it to apply to the state as well as its various
municipalities.25
Calhoun v. City of Providence26 was the first case to interpret
the reach of section 9-31-1. In Calhoun, the plaintiff was arrested
pursuant to an invalidated capias 27 that had failed to be can-
celled.28 The Calhoun court began by arguing the need to retain
some form of immunity, referencing Muskopf v. Corning Hospital
18. 261 A.2d 896 (R.I. 1970).
19. Id. at 901.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 901 (quoting Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118
N.W.2d 785, 803 (Minn. 1962)).
22. Id. 901-02.
23. Id. 901.
24. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-1 (2004).
25. Section 9-31-1(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws provides, in rele-
vant part, that "[tihe state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision
thereof, including all cities and town, shall... hereby be liable in all actions
of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation." Id. § 9-31-
1(a).
26. 390 A.2d 350 (R.I. 1978).
27. "The general name for several species of writs, the common charac-
teristic of which is that they require the officer to take a named defendantinto custody." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 208 (6th ed. 1990).
28. Calhoun, 390 A.2d at 352.
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District,29 in which the California Supreme Court, led by Justice
Traynor, had abolished sovereign immunity:
[A]lthough convinced that sovereign immunity had no
place in American jurisprudence, Justice Traynor was
equally sure that public policy mandated that some ves-
tige of the immunity be retained. For example, he consid-
ered basic policy decisions of government within
constitutional limitations nontortious and, therefore, pro-
tected against claims for damages. Furthermore, abroga-
tion of governmental immunity did not affect the well-
settled rules of immunity of government officials for con-
duct within the scope of their authority.30
The court determined that "[t]here must be weighing of the
injured party's demand for justice against the state's equally valid
claim to exercise certain powers for the good of all without bur-
densome encumbrances and disruptive forces."31 With this in
mind, the court refused to "attribute to the Legislature the intent
to wipe away all barriers to state liability and thereby radically
depart from established conceptions of state tort responsibility
without a clear statement regarding such a change."32 In order to
effectuate the protection of certain state activities in which "im-
portant societal interests are at stake,"33 the court held that where
the state actor who acted on the state's behalf enjoys personal
immunity ("e.g., judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative immuni-
ties"34), the state would likewise be immunized from liability.35 In
adopting such an approach, the court eschewed adopting a formal
distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts, determin-
ing that the interest advanced by either approach was the same:
protecting the state from liability for its policy-making decisions.36
29. 359 P.2d 457, 458 (Cal. 1961).
30. Calhoun, 390 A.2d at 354.
31. Id. at 355.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 356.
34. Id.
35. The court noted that "we do not believe that strict application of re-
spondeat superior principles marks the best approach to the question." Id.
36. "Some courts express the limitation upon state tort liability in terms
of the discretionary acts of state officials. It has been pointed out, however,
that the use of the phrase 'discretionary acts' is merely a reference to the
generally established requirements for personal government protection." Id.
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The Calhoun court's application of its rule to the facts of the
case was straightforward. If the negligent act occurred because of
an error in the clerk's office, the state could be held liable because
the clerk enjoyed no personal immunity.37 If, on the other hand,
the negligent act occurred because the judge had failed to recall
the capias, the state would be immune from suit because the judge
himself enjoyed judicial immunity.38 Because the jury found that
the error had occurred in the clerk's office, the court sustained and
remanded the case with directions to enter judgment for the plain-
tiff.39
Thus, in a span of just two judicial decisions and one legisla-
tive enactment, governmental tort immunity in Rhode Island was
transformed from a doctrine that had been characterized as "an
anachronism[] without rational basis,... operat[ing] so illogically
as to cause serious inequality,"40 into a straightforward, logical
rule of law in Rhode Island. In short, the state could be liable in
tort unless the state actor enjoyed a personal immunity.41 In sub-
sequent decisions, however, the court limited the state's liability,
not by revisiting the extent of the state's immunity from suit, but
by limiting the duty owed by the state.
C. Requirement of a Public Duty
Ryan v. State42 was the court's first opportunity to apply the
Calhoun rule. Ryan involved two plaintiffs, one of whom had been
injured by the negligent driving of one Eaton.43 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles had negligently issued
Eaton a driver's license despite his numerous driving violations,
thereby failing to comply with two separate statutes which should
have prevented Eaton from obtaining a license. 44
Under Calhoun, resolving any question of state immunity
should have been clear. The mistake of issuing the license had
n.5 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 357.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896, 899 (R.I. 1970) (quoting Muskopf
v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 460 (Cal. 1961)).
41. Calhoun, 390 A.2d at 357.
42. 420 A.2d 841 (R.I. 1980).
43. Id. at 842.
44. Id.
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been committed by the registrar, who lacked personal immunity;
therefore, the state itself would likewise have been unable to as-
sert any immunity. The court, however, came to a different con-
clusion. The court neglected to cite the Calhoun rule and instead
cited to New York and Minnesota cases, proposing that "[i]n suits
brought against the state, plaintiffs must show a breach of some
duty owed them in their individual capacities and not merely a
breach of some obligation owed the general public."45 Holding that
the statutes in question were enacted to protect the general pub-
lic, the court affirmed the dismissal.46
The Ryan court's distinction of a public duty from a special
duty has since been followed as the rule of law governing negli-
gence suits against the state, subject, however, to three qualifica-
tions of the rule: the special duty exception, the governmental-
proprietary distinction and the egregious conduct exception.47
1. The Special Duty Exception
Orzechowski v. State4s was the first case in which the court
articulated how the state might be held liable to an individual for
the violation of a statute. In Orzechowski, a parolee who had been
released from prison before being statutorily eligible shot the
plaintiff, an on-duty patrolman. 49 The plaintiff and his wife filed
suit against the state, alleging that the parole board had been
negligent in releasing the parolee in contravention of a statute
mandating another fifteen years before parole eligibility.50 Affirm-
ing the superior court's dismissal, the supreme court held that the
statute in question did not create a duty to any specific individual
or class of individuals. 51 Thus, by reverse implication, a statute
might, by its own terms, create a duty to a specific individual or a
45. Id. at 843 (citing Southworth v. State, 392 N.E.2d 1254, 1255 (N.Y.
1979) (per curium); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.
1979)).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Quality Court Condo. Ass'n v. Quality Hill Dev. Corp., 641
A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 1994) (special duty exception); Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d
65, 67 (R.I. 1991) (egregious conduct exception); O'Brien v. State, 555 A.2d
334, 338 (R.I. 1989) (governmental-proprietary distinction).
48. 485 A.2d 545.
49. Orzechowski, 485 A.2d at 546.
50. Id. at 546-47.
51. Id. at 549-50.
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specific class of individuals, as opposed to the general public.
The court held similarly in Barratt v. Burlingham,52 in which
the plaintiff had been pulled over for drunk driving by one of the
town's police officers. After observing the plaintiff, the officer per-
mitted him to drive home, in contravention of the state's criminal
drunk driving laws. 53 Subsequently, the plaintiff injured himself
in an automobile accident.5 4 As in Orzechowski, the court held that
the applicable statute created a duty owed to the general public,
thereby insulating the town from liability under the public duty
doctrine. 55 Additionally, the court determined that the plaintiffs
interaction with the officer created no special duty owed to him as
an individual.56 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Kelleher
opined that the plaintiffs interaction with the officer did, indeed,
create a special duty owed to the plaintiff, thereby distinguishing
the case from previous cases in which no such special circum-
stances existed where the "'defendant[s] knew or reasonably
should have known of a threat to the specific plaintiff."' 57
Justice Kelleher's position resurfaced as the majority opinion
in Quality Court Condo. Ass'n v. Quality Hill Dev. Corp.,58 where
the court applied Justice Kelleher's vision of the special duty ex-
ception in the plaintiffs' favor. In Quality Court, the plaintiffs sued
the City of Pawtucket alleging that the city's building inspectors
had negligently inspected improperly constructed condominiums. 59
The city argued that issuing building permits and inspecting
buildings created a duty to the general public rather than to spe-
cific individuals.60 The court disagreed, holding that the facts of
52. 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985).
53. Id. at 1222.
54. Id. at 1221.
55. Id. at 1222.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1223 (quoting Orzechowski, 485 A.2d at 549) (Kelleher, J., con-
curring). Justice Kelleher concurred in the judgment, believing that once the
plaintiff had arrived safely home, the town's duty to him ended. It was only
after leaving his house again later that morning that the plaintiff was in-
volved in the automobile accident that resulted in his injuries. Id. at 1223-24.
Justice Kelleher's position was vindicated writing for the majority in Knud-
sen v. Hall, 490 A.2d 976, 978 (R.I. 1985), in which the court held that be-
cause the state's duty was to the general public, and the plaintiffs were not
specifically identifiable, the plaintiffs could not recover against the state. Id.
58. 641 A.2d 746 (R.I. 1994).
59. Id. at 747-48.
60. See id. at 750.
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the case brought these plaintiffs "specifically into the realm of [the
city's] knowledge."61 Because the plaintiffs had been in contact
with the city building inspectors at the time of the inspection,62
the court reasoned that "the city's duty was to the individual own-
ers of the condominium's units and 'not to some amorphous, un-
known 'public'," 63 Thus emerged the rule of a special duty where
"the plaintiffs have had some form of prior contact with govern-
ment officials who then embark on a course of conduct which en-
dangers the plaintiffs, or they have come within the knowledge of
the officials so that the injury can be or should have been fore-
seen."64 Accordingly, after Quality Court, a special duty could exist
even if the statute in question created a duty to the general public,
rather than to a specific individual.
2. The Governmental-Proprietary Function Distinction
To further obviate the possibly harsh effects of the public duty
doctrine, the court, in Catone v. Medberry65 and its companion
case, O'Brien v. State,66 further refined the application of the pub-
lic duty doctrine. The facts giving rise to this distinction were an
automobile accident in Catone,67 and a trip-and-fall in O'Brien.68
In both cases the superior court held that the state had owed the
plaintiffs no specific duty under the public duty doctrine. 69
The Catone court analyzed each context in which the public
duty doctrine had previously been invoked, 70 and determined that
"[i]n every case in which [the court has] applied the public duty
doctrine, the government or its agent [had been] engaged in an ac-
tivity inherently incapable of being performed by private indi-
viduals."71 The court added: "[w]hen governmental employees
61. Id. at 751 (quoting Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219, 1223 (R.I.
1985) (Kelleher, J., concurring)).
62. Id. at 748.
63. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
64. Chakuroff v. Boyle, 667 A.2d 1256, 1258 (R.I. 1995) (citing Quality
Court, 641 A.2d at 750).
65. 555 A.2d 328 (R.I. 1989).
66. 555 A.2d 334 (R.I. 1989).
67. 555 A.2d at 329.
68. 555 A.2d at 335.
69. Catone, 555 A.2d at 330.
70. Id. at 331.
71. Id. at 333.
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engage in activities normally undertaken by private individu-
als ... there is no need to cloak them in the protection of the pub-
lic duty doctrine."72 Distinguishing between activity "inherently
incapable" of being undertaken by private individuals and activity
"normally" undertaken by private individuals, the court opined:
The primary purpose of the public duty doctrine is to en-
courage the effective administration of governmental op-
erations by removing the threat of potential litigation.
This need to protect the government's ability to perform
certain functions is particularly relevant when the activ-
ity in question involves a high degree of discretion such as
governmental planning or political decision making. The
state would be unable to function if liability [were] im-
posed each time an individual was deleteriously effected
by such activities. We shall therefore continue to immu-
nize the government for harm resulting from discretion-
ary acts.7 3
In holding the public duty doctrine inapplicable, the court
reasoned that it "[could] think of no conceivable public-policy con-
sideration which would be furthered by liberating state-employee
drivers from adherence to the rules of the road."74 Additionally,
the court specifically rejected any resurrection of the distinction
between the state's governmental and proprietary functions. 75
Thus, it becomes apparent that the court intended "activities in-
herently incapable of being performed by private individuals" to
mean those activities in which the state exercises some discretion
or public-policy consideration. 76
72. Id.
73. Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. See id.
76. Id. This interpretation of Catone is supported by the fact that the au-
thor of the opinion, Justice Murray, cited to Catone in his advisory opinion to
the governor, written two years later, for the proposition that discretionary
acts of the state are barred by the doctrine of discretionary immunity, for
which he also cited to United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), the prin-
ciple case upon which modern discretionary immunity analysis is based. See
Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 953 (R.I. 1991).
Additionally, and consistent with Catone, the doctrine of discretionary im-
munity rejects any distinction between governmental functions and non-
governmental, or proprietary, functions of government. See, e.g., Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1988).
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The Catone analysis, however, was not applied in a case de-
cided the very same day, O'Brien v. State.7 7 The analysis in
O'Brien began similar to that in Catone by noting that the state
engages in some activities that a private person does not.7 8 But
whereas the Catone court qualified its distinction by reasoning
that the state sometimes engages in discretionary decisions or pol-
icy-making considerations, the O'Brien court failed to do the same.
The resulting distinction resembled the difference between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions found under the abrogated
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the resurrection of which the
Catone court specifically rejected.7 9 Recognizing this distinction,
the O'Brien court unequivocally declared that its new test was not
a mere reincarnation of the old governmental-proprietary function
test; whereas under the doctrine of sovereign immunity the rele-
vant inquiry was whether the state had "[a] private or corporate
interest,"80 under the court's new test the inquiry would be
"whether this is an activity that a private person or corporation
would be likely to carry out."8 1 Although the O'Brien court ex-
pressed otherwise, in fact the two tests are essentially the same.8 2
The public duty doctrine had been eroded to the extent that it
would not apply to tortious acts committed in the execution of the
state's proprietary functions; however, it would remain protective
of the state's governmental functions. It remained, therefore, pro-
tective of some of the state's discretionary, policy-making actions,
but only to the extent that such actions could be classified as gov-
ernmental. The egregious conduct exception would remove even
that protection.
77. 555 A.2d 334 (R.I. 1989).
78. See id. at 337.
79. See Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 333 (R.I. 1989).
80. Wixon v. City of Newport, 13 R.I. 454, 459 (1881).
81. O'Brien, 555 A.2d at 337.
82. Under the same chapter of the Rhode Island General Laws in the
Tort Claims Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 - 9-31-3 (2004), the same test is
used to determine whether the state's action was "proprietary." Id. §§ 9-3 1-2 -
9-31-3; see Hous. Auth. of the City of Providence v. Orepoza, 713 A.2d 1262,
1263 (R.I. 1998) (holding that in determining whether activity is proprietary,
"[t]he appropriate inquiry is 'whether the activity [at issue] was one that a
private person or corporation would carry out.'").
2005]
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3. The Egregious Conduct Exception
The egregious conduct exception is a true exception to the
public duty doctrine because it allows a plaintiff to recover from
the state even though the negligent activity alleged is governmen-
tal, and even though the duty owed is to the general public. 83 Ver-
ity v. Danti84 gave rise to this exception. In Verity an automobile
struck and severely injured a thirteen-year old girl as she stepped
off the sidewalk to navigate around an overgrown tree.85 Her
mother brought suit against the state for failing to maintain the
sidewalk in a safe condition.8 6 Consistent with O'Brien v. State87
and Knudsen v. Hall,8 8 the Providence County Superior Court
dismissed the plaintiffs action.89 Although the superior court had
ruled correctly under existing precedent, the supreme court re-
versed, creating a new rule: "When the state has knowledge that it
has created a circumstance that forces an individual into a posi-
tion of peril and subsequently chooses not to remedy the situation,
the public duty doctrine does not shield that state from liability."90
The court reasoned that to give the state immunity for such egre-
gious conduct would be enabling,91 especially in a case such as this
one where "the state's negligence in this instance [was] so extreme
that to bar suit under the public duty doctrine would effectively
excuse governmental employees from remedying perilous situa-
tions that they themselves have created."92
The court refined the egregious conduct exception in Haley v.
Town of Lincoln93 by requiring that three distinct elements be met
in order to find state action egregious:
(1) the state, in undertaking a discretionary action or in
maintaining or failing to maintain the product of a discre-
tionary action, created circumstances that forced a rea-
83. See Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67 (R.I. 1991).
84. 585 A.2d 65 (R.I. 1991).
85. Id. at 65-66.
86. Id.
87. 555 A.2d 334 (R.I. 1989) (governmental function).
88. 490 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1985) (holding maintenance of public sidewalks is
a public duty).
89. Verity, 585 A.2d at 66.
90. Id. at 67.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 611 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1992).
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sonably prudent person into a position of extreme peril;
(2) the state, through its employees or agents capable of
abating the danger, had actual or constructive knowledge
or the perilous circumstances; and (3) the state, having
been afforded a reasonable amount of time to eliminate
the dangerous condition, failed to do so.94
The second and third elements express merely that there
must be a breach of duty.95 When combined with the exception's
disregard of a public or specific duty, it establishes that the state
may be held liable pursuant to standard principles of negligence
for even its governmental functions, which necessarily include dis-
cretionary, policy-making considerations, restricted only by the
requirement that the plaintiff be placed in a "position of extreme
peril,"96 a question of duty.
The egregious conduct exception was still capable of protect-
ing the state's discretionary, policy-making functions, but only to
the extent that those functions would not force a person into a po-
sition of extreme peril. Recent permissiveness as to what consti-
tutes extreme peril, however, has rendered the public duty
doctrine all but meaningless by allowing the state to be held liable
for what might be considered ordinary negligence.
III. AN END TO THE PUBLIC DuTy DOCTRINE?
A. The Egregious Conduct Exception Revisited
The egregious conduct exception has devolved to such a point
where it allows a plaintiff to make his case using traditional neg-
ligence principles with little regard for whether the plaintiff was,
indeed, forced into a position of extreme peril. Although the inter-
pretation of extreme peril was initially restrictive in Verity,97 sub-
sequent decisions have expanded the egregious conduct exception
beyond the restrictive language and compelling facts in that case,
albeit inconsistently.98
94. Id. at 849.
95. Tedesco v. Connors, No. 03-469, 2005 WL 955030, at *4 n.3 (R.I. Apr.
27, 2005) (addressing the third element only).
96. Haworth v. Lannon, 813 A.2d 62, 65 (R.I. 2000).
97. See supra PartII.C.3.
98. See Tedesco, No. 03-469, 2005 WL 955030, at *1 (holding that
7432005]
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Recently, in the Newport County Superior Court, a plaintiff
prevailed against the state in a slip-and-fall suit for injuries re-
sulting from the disrepair of its sidewalk.99 The plaintiff brought
the case under the egregious conduct exception, alleging that the
state had notice of the defective condition based upon previous
suits from injuries on the same sidewalk, and had taken no steps
to alleviate the situation.100 Thus, the necessity of "extreme peril"
seems to have had little bearing on whether the egregious conduct
exception would apply, the case turning merely on whether there
was a breach of duty.101
whether failure to install bicycle-safe sewer grates was egregious conduct is a
question for the jury); Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1168-69 (R.I.
2001) (holding that a grant of an entertainment license for a music festival on
private property resulting in physical injury was egregious conduct); L.A. Ray
Realty v. Town Council of the Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202, 208-09(R.I. 1997) (holding that the adoption and enforcement of an invalid ordi-
nance which interfered with plaintiffs' "legitimate expectations regarding
their property" was egregious conduct); DeFusco v. Todesca Forte, Inc., 683
A.2d 363, 365 (R.I. 1996) (holding that the opening of a highway exit rampbefore construction was completed resulting in an automobile accident was
not egregious conduct); Cornell v. Jan Co. Cent., Inc., 671 A.2d 1223, 1225(R.I. 1996) ("no egregious conduct could be established by the placement of afunctioning traffic signal on the sole ground that arrangements should havebeen made for a delayed light or a turning arrow."); Houle v. Galloway Sch.Lines, Inc., 643 A.2d 822, 827 (R.I. 1994) (holding that whether the location of
a school bus stop resulting in an automobile accident is egregious conduct
was question of fact for a jury); Catri v. Hopkins, 609 A.2d 966, 969 (R.I.
1992) (holding that the failure to install a traffic light, despite public demand,
resulting in an automobile accident was not egregious conduct); Haley v.Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 850 (R.I. 1992) (holding that the placement of
unlit sawhorses in a roadway resulting in an automobile accident was egre-
gious conduct if the state had notice and did not remedy the situation).
In a recent attempt to clarify the egregious conduct exception's appli-
cation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that each element of the
exception, insofar as reasonable minds can differ, is essentially a jury ques-
tion. Tedesco, 2005 WL 955030, at *3-4. This is likely to produce even more
inconsistency by making the question of duty found in the exception's first
element a question for the jury. Cf Soave v. Nat'l Velour Corp., 863 A.2d 186,188 (R.I. 2004) ("Whether... a duty of care runs from a defendant to a plain-
tiff is a question of law for the court to decide.").
99. John Cunningham, Lawyer Wins Rare Slip & Fall Against State,
RHODE ISLAND LAWYER'S WEEKLY, Aug. 14, 2004, at 1.
100. Id.
101. But see, e.g., Brady v. State, No. CIV. A. 99-0009, 2002 WL 1035431,
at *10 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 10, 2002) (holding that a build-up of ice and snow
resulting in a slip and fall outside the State House was not "so egregious as to
rise to the level necessary to qualify for [the] exception"); Long v. State, No.
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The consequence of this and repeated similar outcomes serves
to remove from the state routine discretionary decisions. In Verity,
the state had been extremely derelict in maintaining the sidewalk
to the extent that it had become impassible. 10 2 It is unlikely that
this inattention had been caused by any policy choice of the state,
but rather by its egregious conduct. In the aforementioned New-
port superior court case, however, the sidewalk was merely in dis-
repair. 103 The possibility of repeated liability in future cases may
well force the state to keep its walkways in flawless repair, likely
a costly chore. The choice of which walkways receive attention is a
discretionary, policy-based, and, occasionally, political decision
that should be left to agencies and elected bodies, not to courts.
Under the public duty doctrine this discretion is preserved for the
state because such action is governmental, to which a public duty
would be owed.104 The current application of the egregious conduct
exception, however, has undermined this discretion by requiring
only a showing of ordinary negligence.
The egregious conduct exception, has, in addition, not been
limited to physical injury. In L.A. Realty v. Town of Cumber-
land,05 the town adopted and enforced an invalid zoning ordi-
nance which defeated the plaintiffs' "legitimate expectations
regarding their property."0 6 The court held that the town's actions
were "egregious misconduct," so as to deprive the town of govern-
mental immunity from the plaintiffs' tort claims. 0 7 Such a deci-
sion provides little confidence that the egregious conduct
exception will continue to apply to the narrow class of cases for
which it was originally intended. Verity involved serious bodily in-
jury. It seems unlikely that the Verity court would have character-
ized egregious conduct as resulting in an "imperiling situation"
CIV. A. NC 99-0325, 2002 WL 1371049, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 13, 2002)
(holding that dirt resulting in slip and fall on the Newport County Court-
house was not egregious conduct).
102. Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67 (R.I. 1991).
103. Cunningham, supra note 99, at 1.
104. See, e.g., Torres v. Damicis, 853 A.2d 1233, 1239 (R.I. 2004).
105. 698 A.2d 202 (R.I. 1997).
106. Id. at 208.
107. Id. at 208, 209. But cf Haworth v. Lannon, 813 A.2d 62, 65 (R.I.
2003) (holding that the alleged negligent inspection of plaintiffs' homes caus-
ing flooding did not amount to egregious conduct or create a situation of ex-
treme peril).
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had the court anticipated that the exception would later apply to
damages arising out of the loss of property use as well. Those
cases in which the egregious conduct exception has been inter-
preted to require evidence of a mere indicia of physical injury or,
as in L.A. Ray Realty, simply property damage rather than egre-
gious conduct resulting in an imperiling situation have ensured
the public duty doctrine is no longer an effective means by which
to strike a balance between a plaintiffs' and the state's competing
interests. In addition, the exception has been inconsistently ap-
plied in similar cases resulting in dissimilar results for similarly
situated plaintiffs.108 Accordingly, it is time for the court to abolish
the public duty doctrine.
B. Rejection of the Public Duty Doctrine
The difficulty encountered in applying the public duty doc-
trine's exceptions only to arrive at irreconcilable results has
caused the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in recent decisions, to
recognize the doctrine's increasing fragility.109 Nevertheless, the
court has expressed reservations about abandoning the public
duty doctrine:
Our holding rests on the policy that the public treasury
should not be exposed to claims involving acts done for
the public good as a whole, given that the exercise of
these functions cannot reasonably be compared with func-
tions that are or may be exercised by a private person.
Additionally, the public duty doctrine continues to
serve a pragmatic and necessary function because it can
encourage the effective administration of governmental
operations by removing the threat of potential litigation.
Moreover, a governmental unit should not be held liable
108. See supra note 98.
109. See Tedesco v. Connors, No. 03-469, 2005 WL 955030, at *7 (R.I. Apr.27, 2005) ("'[Mluch of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises
and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by apoorly reasoned counter-privilege to the other.'" (quoting Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948))); Haworth v. Lannon, 813 A.2d 62, 66 (R.I.2003) ("[We have observed that 'the doctrine verges on the brink of being alegal enigma because of its many exceptions.'"); Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787
A.2d 1158, 1166 (R.I. 2001) ("[T]he doctrine verges on the brink of being a le-
gal enigma because of its many exceptions.").
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for activities it performs that could not and would not in
the ordinary course of events be performed by a private
person at all. Eliminating the public duty doctrine could
subject the state to potential liability for each and every
action it undertook. Even minimal insight reveals that
this would lead to hesitation on the part of the state to
undertake and perform duties necessary to the function-
ing of a free society. 110
Despite similar reservations, however, numerous sister juris-
dictions have abandoned the doctrine. 1 ' In fact, very few courts
addressing the doctrine's continued validity have actually retained
it.112 These courts, in abandoning the doctrine, reason that the
public duty doctrine is simply a resurrection of sovereign immu-
nity.113
No aspect of the public duty doctrine more closely resembles
the abrogated doctrine of sovereign immunity than the govern-
mental-proprietary function distinction. For the same reason the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated - the confused and
irreconcilable results obtained in distinguishing between govern-
mental and proprietary functions - the public duty doctrine
110. Haworth, 813 A.2d at 66 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
See also Tedesco, No. 03-469, 2005 WL 955030, at *7 ("'But somehow it has
proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary
controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court.'" (quoting Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948))).
111. See Beaudrie v. Henderson, 631 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Mich. 2001); Drake
v. Drake, 618 N.W.2d 650, 657 (Neb. 2000); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610
N.E.2d 305, 307 (Mass. 1993); Doucette v. Town of Bristol, 635 A.2d 1387,
1390 (N.H. 1993); Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 638 A.2d 561, 566 (Vt.
1993); Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 230, 232 (Alaska 1987);
Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643,
653 (Wyo. 1986); Wood v. Milin, 397 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Wis. 1986); Schear v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 734 (N.M. 1984); Ryan v. State, 656
P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351, 1358 (La.
1980); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010,
1015 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 1979); Bren-
nen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 725 (Or. 1979); Macaluso v. Knowles,
775 A.2d 108, 110 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
112. See Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36, 41-42 (W.Va. 1989); Gordon v.
Bridgeport, 544 A.2d 1185, 1198-99 (Conn. 1988).
113. E.g., City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Alaska
1985); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010,
1022 (Fla. 1979).
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should be abolished as well. Rhode Island courts have experienced
difficulty applying the distinction, resulting in inconsistent and
contradictory outcomes.1 4 It is for this reason that most jurisdic-
tions, including Rhode Island, eliminated the distinction when ab-
rogating sovereign immunity."15
114. See Brady v. State, No. CIVA.99-0009, 2002 WL 1035431, at *5 (R.I.Super. Ct. May 10, 2002) (citing Kuhl v. Perrin, 706 A.2d 1328, 1329 (R.I.1998) ("[Olperation and maintenance of a public school is a governmental
function and not a proprietary one."); Hous. Auth. of the City of Providence v.Oropeza, 713 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1998) ("[Tlhe function at issue here,
namely, the providing of security within and by the housing authority is pro-prietary in nature."); Matarese v. Dunham, 689 A.2d 1057, 1058 (R.I. 1997)("[Mlaintenance of government buildings is plainly a governmental func-
tion."); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of the Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d202, 208 (R.I. 1997) ("[We have no doubt that the adoption and application of
a zoning ordinance is a governmental function."); Chakuroff v. Boyle, 667A.2d 1256, 1258 (R.I. 1995) ("[T]he operation and the maintenance of a public
school is a governmental function not a proprietary one."); Quality CourtCondo. Ass'n v. Quality Hill Dev. Corp., 641 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 1994) ("[Altthe outset we note that the activities and the inspections that are required to
ensure compliance with the state building code cannot be engaged in by pri-
vate enterprise."); Custom Flight Sys. of New England, Inc. v. State, 641 A.2d1324, 1324 (R.I. 1994) ("[Rlunning a public airport is exclusively an activityperformed by a public entity."); Longtin v. D'Ambra Constr. Co., 588 A.2d1044, 1046 (R.I. 1991) ("[Ilt cannot be disputed that the reconstruction ofMendon Road, a state highway, is an activity that is performed exclusively bythe state."); DeLong v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 75, 76 (R.I.1990) ("[Tlhe operation of a beach is a function that many private persons or
corporations have carried out in this state."); Polaski v. O'Reilly, 559 A.2d646, 647 (R.I. 1989) ("[Iln placing or failing to place or maintain a traffic-
control sign, the city of Warwick was acting in an area in which no privateperson could intrude."); R.I. Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d 624,627 (R.I. 1988) ("NELS's essential function was to collect the principle andinterest on outstanding student loans and to maintain records on all transac-
tions. These functions are proprietary in nature."); Lepore v. R.I. Pub. TransitAuth., 524 A.2d 574, 575 (R.I. 1987) ("[Wle do not believe that maintaining apublic-transportation authority is a function that is so intertwined with gov-
erning that we will consider it a governmental function. Rather, we shall con-
sider its operation proprietary in nature."). Whether applying the distinction
to liability or damages under the Tort Claims Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 -9-31-3 (2004), these cases demonstrate the inconsistency and confusion in-
herent in the distinction.
115. Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896, 902 (R.I. 1970); DeBry v. Noble,889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995); Taylor v. Murphy, 360 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C.1987); Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 299 S.E.2d 618, 621 (N.C. 1983);Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1155-57 (Okla. 1983); Haverlack v. Port-
age Homes, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ohio 1982); Univ. of Alaska v. Nat'lAircraft Leasing, Ltd., 536 P.2d 121, 128 (Alaska 1975); Hicks v. State, 544P.2d 1153, 1161 (N.M. 1975); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 852
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The case for abrogation of the public duty doctrine is most
compelling in Rhode Island because of the egregious conduct ex-
ception, which is unique to Rhode Island law. The egregious con-
duct exception has sufficiently undermined the court's rationale
that the state should not be held liable for functions performed in
a governmental capacity, because the exception allows the state to
be held to an ordinary standard of negligence for even its uniquely
governmental activities.11
6
While the public duty doctrine no longer serves its purpose,
there are some governmental functions which must necessarily be
protected. These particular functions have, since the abrogation of
sovereign immunity in Becker v. Beaudoin,117 been a recurring
theme for the court - namely, protecting the government's discre-
tionary, policy-making decisions.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PUBLIC DuTy DOCTRINE
In order to better protect the state's discretionary, policy-
making function, there are two alternatives to the public duty doc-
trine: (1) personal immunities and (2) a discretionary-ministerial
distinction.
A. Personal Immunities
There are several firmly established immunities that may
protect the state from suit for its actors' discretionary decisions.
118
(W.Va. 1975); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. Of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 889 (Pa.
1973); Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. 1972); Parish v. Pitts,
429 S.W.2d 45, 53 (Ark. 1968); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738,
742 (Ky. 1964); Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 112 (Ariz.
1963); Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803
(Minn. 1962); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Wis. 1962);
Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 461-62 (Cal. 1961); Williams v.
City of Detroit, 111 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty.
Unit. Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 95 (Ill. 1959); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).
116. See supra Part III.A.
117. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
118. See Cronan ex. rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 880-81 (R.I. 2001)
(prosecutorial immunity); Petrone v. Town of Foster, 769 A.2d 591, 595-96
(R.I. 2001) (quasi-judicial administrative immunity); Estate of Sherman v.
Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 475 (R.I. 2000) (judicial immunity); Ensey v. Culhane,
727 A.2d 687, 691 (R.I. 1999) (qualified immunity for members of the execu-
tive branch); Maynard v. Beck, 741 A.2d 866,871 (R.I. 1999) (legislative im-
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In Calhoun v. City of Providence, the Court expressed a desire to
apply these personal immunities to the state, though not under a
strict application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. 119 Such
immunities may well protect the government from suit for its offi-
cials' discretionary acts - acts that must be engaged in without
fear of suit.120 A renewed emphasis on personal immunities may
succeed in protecting officials' discretionary acts where the public
duty doctrine has failed.
One example of the public duty doctrine's failure to protect
discretionary decisions is L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of the
Town of Cumberland,121 in which the plaintiffs alleged and estab-
lished at trial that certain town officials acted improperly in pass-
ing a zoning ordinance that negatively affected them.122 The court
held that the defendants had been involved in a governmental
function;23 however, they had engaged in egregious conduct.
"[TIhe town's adoption and enforcement of an invalid ordinance in
order to interfere with plaintiffs' legitimate expectations regarding
their property amounted to egregious misconduct," thereby deny-
ing the town immunity under the public duty doctrine.124
Yet, in Maynard v. Beck,' 25 plaintiffs similarly alleged that
municipal zoning and other town officials attempted to improperly
rezone certain property.126 The court, citing a recent United States
Supreme Court decision,127 held that the defendants "[were] enti-
tled to invoke legislative immunity for their ... discretionary and
policy making decisions." 28
If the court applied the Maynard court's holding to the facts of
L.A. Ray Realty, that case would certainly have come out differ-
ently. The L.A. Ray Realty defendants' act of passing a zoning or-
munity).
119. 390 A.2d 350, 356-57 (R.I. 1978).
120. See id.
121. 698 A.2d 202 (R.I. 1997).
122. Id. at 205.
123. Id. at 208.
124. Id. at 208-09.
125. 741 A.2d 866 (R.I. 1999).
126. Id. at 868. Specifically, town officials "altered specific portions of theproposed draft zoning ordinance, thereby rendering it inconsistent with the
town's Comprehensive Plan." Id.
127. Id. at 869 (citing Bogan v. Scott-Harris 523 U.S. 44 (1998) (holding
that absolute legislative immunity applies to municipal legislators)).
128. Id. at 872.
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dinance would have afforded those defendants the protection of
legislative immunity, and under the Calhoun rule the town as
well. 129 Moreover, the immunity provided in Maynard would have
more success than the public duty doctrine in accomplishing the
public duty doctrine's stated rationale - namely, protecting the
state from suit for its discretionary, governmental functions.
In addition to better protecting the state substantively, per-
sonal immunities provide better procedural protections as well.
This superior procedural protection arises from the fact that per-
sonal immunities provide immunity from suit, not just immunity
from damages; thus, it is appropriate for such claims against the
state to be dismissed earlier in the litigation process. 130 Immunity
under the public duty doctrine, on the other hand, is immunity
from liability; therefore, dismissal of such claims becomes appro-
priate much later in the litigation process, 131 thereby imposing
greater litigation costs on both parties for a claim that may ulti-
mately be dismissed.
B. The Discretionary-Ministerial Distinction
While application of personal immunities provides distinct
substantive and procedural advantages to the state over the public
duty doctrine, it applies to the state through a narrow class of ac-
tors: those who themselves have personal immunity. This creates
a disadvantage in that governmental actors may engage in discre-
tionary, policy-making decisions but, because of their status, are
themselves not privileged with immunity. Consequently, the state
remains exposed to liability for a broad range of discretionary ac-
tivities. Many jurisdictions have resolved this problem by adopting
a discretionary-ministerial distinction, 132 with liability for a state's
129. See Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 356 (R.I. 1978).
130. See Estate of Sherman v. Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 474 (R.I. 2000)
("[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just an immunity from
an ultimate assessment of damages . ... '[I]mmunity is not overcome by alle-
gations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be re-
solved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.'").
131. See, e.g., Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 628 (R.I. 1998) ("a case in
which the public-duty doctrine is asserted as a defense is not generally ap-
propriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss... pursuant to Super. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6)... .") (citing Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 850 n.1 (R.I.
1992)).
132. See Conlin v. City of Saint Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 2000);
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ministerial acts, and immunity for its discretionary acts.133
Indeed, federal courts employ a discretionary-ministerial dis-
tinction under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).134 The United
States Supreme Court has developed a sophisticated test for de-
termining whether an act is discretionary, thereby shielding the
United States government from liability.135 In analyzing whether
an act is discretionary, a court should determine "whether the ac-
tion is a matter of [judgment or] choice for the acting employee." 36
Keystone Elec. Mfg., Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 348 (Iowa
1998); Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Mo. 1996); Olson
v. City of Garrison, 539 N.W.2d 663, 665 (N.D. 1995); Keegan v. State, 896
P.2d 618, 619-20 (Utah 1995); Linville v. City of Janesville, 516 N.W.2d 427,
433 (Wis. 1994); Gardner v. City of Concord, 624 A.2d 1337, 1340 (N.H. 1993);
State v. Mason, 724 P.2d 1289, 1292-93 (Colo. 1986); McCall by Andrews v.
Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985); Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 853(Cal. 1984); Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57, 69-70 (Kan. 1984); Indus. Indem.
Co. v. State, 669 P.2d 561, 566 (Alaska 1983); Julius Rothschild & Co. v.
State, 655 P.2d 877, 881 (Haw. 1982); Brown v. Brown, 432 A.2d 493, 500(N.J. 1981); Mason v. Bitton, 534 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Wash. 1975); see also
Hughes v. City of Hartford, 96 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D. Conn. 2000); Lorber
v. Town of Hamburg, 639 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Johnson v.
Mers, 664 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Brown v. City of Delray Beach,
652 So.2d 1150, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State Dept. of Mental Health
v. Allen, 427 N.E.2d 2, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); El v. State, 357 N.E.2d 61, 63
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
133. Some jurisdictions apply the discretionary-ministerial distinction as a
planning-operational distinction, whereby discretion in planning activities
will render the state immune, whereas operational activities, even though
involving the exercise of discretion, may subject the state to liability. See 57
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, etc., Tort Liability § 78 (2001). Section 78 of volume
57 in American Jurisprudence cites numerous state decisions in support of
the assertion that
[i]n administering the test distinguishing between discretionary acts
and ministerial functions, the key factor is the presence of basic pol-
icy formulation, planning or policy decisions, which are characterized
by an exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion, be-
cause most states' laws provide for immunity if the government was
acting in that manner at the time of the injury.
Id. § 78 n.1.
134. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (2000). The Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he United States
shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991);
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
136. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
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Where an employee's conduct is dictated by a statute, regulation,
ordinance, or policy, the discretionary exception will not apply be-
cause the employee has exercised no judgment or choice. 137 If the
employee's conduct is indeed a product of choice, the next relevant
inquiry must be "whether that judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception [is] designed to shield."138 This
second inquiry is necessary because it is "Congress' desire to 'pre-
vent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort."' 39 Accordingly, the ex-
ception "protects only [those] governmental actions based on con-
siderations of public policy." 40 And although the exception applies
to governmental actions, there is no need under the exception to
distinguish between governmental and non-governmental proprie-
tary functions.14'
To that end, the United States may not be held liable for
"[a]ny claim.., based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."142 Thus, the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 536-37.
140. Id. at 537; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23. Even though an employee
may be exercising discretion (or, as the term is more commonly used, choice),
an employee may not be exercising discretion in a legal sense (i.e., where the
employee's actions are not based on policy considerations. See Gaubert, 499
U.S. at 325.
There are obviously discretionary acts performed by a Government
agent that are within the scope of his employment but not within the
discretionary function exception because these acts cannot be said to
be based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to accom-
plish. If [an] official[ ... drove an automobile on a mission con-
nected with his official duties and negligently collided with another
car, the exception would not apply. Although driving requires the
constant exercise of discretion, the official's decisions in exercising
that discretion can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory pol-
icy.
Id. at 325 n. 7.
141. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538-39 (rejecting the distinction between
governmental and non-governmental functions); Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1957) (same); Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (same).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
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FTCA, in order to promote good decision making, protects even
the government's poor decisions out of respect for the discretion-
ary decision-making process, thereby ensuring the unobstructed
administration of government by removing the fear of potential li-
ability.143
1. Application
The discretionary function exception is well-suited to provide
the state protection for its policy-making decisions in two catego-
ries of cases in which the public duty doctrine is poised for failure:
licensing and law enforcement. In a third category of cases, signal
maintenance, the discretionary function exception is consistent
with results already achieved under the public duty doctrine.
a. Licensing
The discretionary function exception ensures greater respect
for a legislature's licensing schemes by respecting any discretion
granted by the legislature. If no discretion has been given, the
state can be held liable for deviating from the licensing scheme.
One example of liability imposed for deviating from a licensing
scheme is Berkovitz v. United States,'" in which the plaintiff con-
tracted polio after ingesting a vaccine, the licensing of which had
been approved by the United States.145 The Supreme Court found
that the agency responsible for issuing the license was required to
comply with the applicable statute and regulations, which re-
quired the agency to receive manufacturer data, "examine the
product, and to make a determination that the product complie[d]
with safety standards."146 The Court held that the discretionary
function exception did not bar the plaintiffs cause of action be-
cause the agency had no choice under the statute and regulations
other than to receive the data.147
143. In so doing, the discretionary function exception addresses the court's
fear that by eliminating the public duty doctrine the resulting potential li-
ability "would lead to hesitation on the part of the state to undertake and per-
form duties necessary to the functioning of a free society." Haworth v.
Lannon, 813 A.2d 62, 66 (R.I. 2003).
144. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
145. Id. at 533.
146. Id. at 542.
147. Id. at 542-43.
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Comparatively, in Martinelli v. Hopkins,148 the plaintiff was
injured while attending an annual music festival held on private
property.149 The plaintiff sued the town of Burrillville for negli-
gently issuing the landowner an entertainment license, despite
knowing that in past years the festival's crowd had grown massive
and unruly.150 It would seem that the town unrestricted by statute
or regulation, in granting the plaintiff an entertainment license,
was exercising choice, unlike the defendants in Berkovitz. More-
over, it would seem that the town's decision to grant the enter-
tainment license was, or conceivably could have been, grounded in
social, economic, or political policy. Accordingly, the town's action
would likely be held to be discretionary, and, therefore, the town
immune from liability. Thus, where the public duty doctrine failed
to respect the discretion given the town in granting entertainment
licenses, the discretionary function exception would succeed.
b. Law Enforcement
In contrast to the modem public duty doctrine, the discretion-
ary function exception respects the state's exercise of discretion in
the area of law enforcement as well. In Deuser v. Vecera,'5' the de-
cedent attended a fair on national park grounds in St. Louis, Mis-
souri, run by the National Park Service. After arresting the
decedent for urinating in public, park rangers turned him over to
the St. Louis police. Overwhelmed by the fair, the St. Louis police
elected not to process the decedent and, in conjunction with the
park rangers, released the decedent away from the park. The de-
cedent subsequently wandered onto a highway where he was
struck and killed by a motorist. 52
The Eighth Circuit found that the park ranger's handbook
conferred discretion upon the officers. 153 Aside from the handbook,
however, the court held that "[11aw enforcement decisions of the
148. 787 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2001).
149. Id. at 1161.
150. Id. at 1162. Under the framework of the public duty doctrine, the
town was exercising a governmental function when it issued the property
owner an entertainment license. Id. at 1167. The town was held liable to the
plaintiff under the egregious conduct exception. Id. at 1168-69.
151. 139 F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 1998).
152. Id. at 1195.
153. Id.
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kind involved in making or terminating an arrest must be within
the discretion and judgment of enforcing officers." 154 Accordingly,
the court held that "terminating [the decedent's] arrest, that is,
releasing him without charging him with a crime, was a discre-
tionary function reserved to the judgment of the rangers."155
As to the second level of analysis required under the discre-
tionary function exception, "whether [their] judgment [was] of the
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield,"156 the court held that "the conduct of the rangers here
[was] a classic example of a 'permissible exercise of policy judg-
ment ." 5 7 because in releasing the decedent the rangers were pre-
serving law enforcement resources for maintaining order at the
fair.158 The rangers' conduct satisfied both prongs of inquiry under
the discretionary function exception; therefore, the court affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim. 5 9
Under the discretionary function exception, the result reached
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Barratt v. Burlingham160
would likely remain the same, although under the current public
duty doctrine the case would likely come out differently. Assuming
the officer's act of releasing the plaintiff was a matter of choice,
the relevant inquiry would be whether the officer's decision was
based on social, economic, or political policy:
The evidence indicate[d] that [the officer] eventually al-
lowed [the plainitiff] to drive, not because he believed [the
plaintiff] to be sober, but because [the officer] - who had
temporarily forsaken his traffic-control responsibilities to
attend to [the plaintiff] and his drinking and traveling
companions - decided it was time to untangle the traffic
jam that had been created. [A witness] testified that the
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
157. Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 539).
158. Id. at 1196.
159. Id.
160. 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985). The plaintiff was pulled over by one of the
town's police officers who, after observing the plaintiff in a drunken state,
permitted him to drive home. Id. at 1220-21. The plaintiff was subsequently
injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 1221.
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closing-time scene was lively and confusing .... 161
Like the park rangers in Deuser, the officer's decision to re-
lease the plaintiffs was, rightly or wrongly, likely motivated from
a desire to divert his resources to the traffic jam, "a 'permissible
exercise of policy judgment."' 62 Accordingly, the state would re-
main immune from liability for the officer's discretionary actions.
c. Signal Maintenance
The results under the discretionary function exception with
regard to signal maintenance would likely achieve the same re-
sults under the public duty doctrine; however, under the discre-
tionary function exception those results are based upon respect for
the state's choice of policy rather than upon the anachronistic no-
tion that there is "a duty to none where there is a duty to all."163 In
Indian Towing Co., Inc., v. United States,164 the Supreme Court
distinguished between the government's discretionary decision to
operate a lighthouse and its obligation to use due care in main-
taining the signal once the lighthouse had been established. The
Court reasoned that "one who undertakes to warn the public of
danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good Sa-
maritan' task in a careful manner."165 Thus the Coast Guard had
no choice in whether to maintain the light, though it did have a
choice in whether to establish the lighthouse in the first place. 166
Similar results are currently achieved under the public duty
doctrine in Rhode Island with regard to traffic signals, though
based upon a different rationale. Although the state is under no
duty to install a traffic signal, 167 once a traffic signal has been in-
stalled, the state's failure to maintain it is held to be egregious
conduct.168
161. Id. at 1223 (R.I. 1985) (Kelleher, J., concurring).
162. See Deuser, 139 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 539).
163. Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1986).
164. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
165. Id. at 64-65.
166. Id. at 69.
167. See Hudson v. City of Providence, 830 A.2d 1105, 1106-07 (R.I. 2003);
Catri v. Hopkins, 609 A.2d 966, 968-69 (R.I. 1992).
168. Bierman v. Shookster, 590 A.2d 402, 404-05 (R.I. 1991); see Hudson,
830 A.2d at 1107; Catri, 609 A.2d at 968-69.
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2. Critique
Although the discretionary function exception is primarily
concerned with protecting the policy-making function of govern-
ment, it has received criticism for being too broad in its applica-
tion.169 This criticism has focused on the Supreme Court's decision
in Gaubert to inject an objective standard of analysis into the dis-
cretionary function exception, 170 the practical implication of which
is to create "a presumption that any discretionary act, as long as
the actor's discretion has been granted by statute, regulation, or
internal agency guidelines... [is] policy-driven, unless the plain-
tiff can demonstrate to the contrary... .. 171 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the FTCA provides the
government with substantially greater substantive and procedural
protection from suit.172
Substantively, the exception's protection applies not only to
those actions actually based on considerations of public policy, but
also to those actions potentially based on considerations of public
policy as well. 173 Procedurally, the Court's interpretation makes it
more likely that a plaintiffs claim will be dismissed on a Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion because "the gov-
ernment can now argue, as a general matter, and without any fac-
tual development, that the decision or decisions at issue in an
FTCA claim are susceptible to policy analysis regardless of
whether any such analysis actually took place." 7 4
Although the Court's reformulation of the discretionary func-
tion exception expands protection for governmental actions, it nev-
ertheless retains its advantages over the public duty doctrine.
Applied in place of the public duty doctrine, the discretionary
function exception would produce more consistent, predictable re-
169. See Mark C. Niles, "Nothing But Mischief" The Federal Tort Claims
Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1281
(2002).
170. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) ("The focus of
the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion
conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and
on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.").
171. Niles, supra note 168, at 1328.
172. Id. at 1331-32.
173. Id. at 1332 (citing Harold J. Kent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Im-
munity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1549-50 (1992)).
174. Id. at 1329-30.
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sults for plaintiffs and defendants alike while at the same time
protecting the state's policy-driven decisions, thereby ensuring the
effective administration of government. It is for this reason that,
despite any criticism directed toward it, the Supreme Court's
modern formulation of the discretionary function exception has
been cited favorably by many state high courts when interpreting
the extent of state governmental tort immunity,1'7 5 and in Rhode
Island as well. 176
V. CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity once provided the state and its political
subdivisions with comprehensive governmental tort immunity.
77
Following the abrogation of sovereign immunity, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court imported the public duty doctrine in order to pro-
tect the state from liability. 78 Finding such protections too broad
and all-encompassing, however, the court limited the doctrine's
application by carving out several distinctions and exceptions.
79
The last of these limiting exceptions, the egregious conduct excep-
tion, allows a plaintiff to make its case against the state merely by
showing a breach of duty, regardless of whether that duty was
175. See Harris ex rel. Harris v. McCray, 867 S.2d 188, 195 (Miss. 2003);
Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 85 (Tenn. 2001); Searles v.
Agency of Transportation, 762 A.2d 812, 813-14 (Vt. 2000); Ex parte Cran-
man, 792 So.2d 392, 409-10 (Ala. 2000); Brantley v. Dept. of Human Res., 523
S.E.2d 571, 575 (Ga. 1999); Goodman v. City of Le Claire, 587 N.W.2d 232,
238 (Iowa 1998); D.K. Buskirk & Sons, Inc. v. State, 560 N.W.2d 462, 468
(Neb. 1997); Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238, 241 (Me. 1996);
Kimps v. Hill, 546 N.W.2d 151, 161 (Wis. 1996); Olsen v. City of Garrison,
539 N.W.2d 663, 666 (N.D. 1995); R.E. v. State, 878 P.2d 1341, 1349 (Alaska
1994); Simeon v. Doe, 618 So.2d 848, 856 (La. 1993); Harry Stoller & Co., Inc.
v. City of Lowell, 587 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Mass. 1992); Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d
100, 104 (Minn. 1991).
176. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 953
(R.I. 1991) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991)) ("[Alny
[negligence] claims that do arise would be based on discretionary acts of the
state and would therefore be barred by the doctrine of discretionary immu-
nity.").
177. See Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 353 (R.I. 1978);
McQuILLAN, supra note 10, at § 53.02.10.
178. See Ryan v. State, Dept. of Transp., 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1980).
179. See Quality Court Condo. Ass'n v. Quality Hill Dev. Corp., 641 A.2d
746, 750 (R.I. 1994) (special duty exception); Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67
(R.I. 1991) (egregious conduct exception); O'Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 337
(R.I. 1989) (governmental-proprietary distinction).
75920051
760 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.10:731
owed to the specific plaintiff or to the general public, and regard-
less of whether such duty arose from the state functioning in a
governmental or proprietary capacity, thereby allowing the plain-
tiff to make a case of ordinary negligence against the state.18 0 For
this reason that the public duty doctrine no longer affords the
state the substantive safeguards from liability that it was de-
signed to provide.
Because the doctrine can no longer provide the state with pro-
tection, it is incapable of protecting the state's discretionary, pol-
icy-making decisions. Although protecting the state's policy-
making ability was the goal of governmental tort immunity follow-
ing the abrogation of sovereign immunity, under the public duty
doctrine the focus has shifted to legal formalism and the ability to
classify state activity. Under the public duty doctrine, when cer-
tain activities cannot be classified under the existing framework,
the court creates exceptions.
In the process of distinguishing and excepting, the doctrine
has become confusing in its application, resulting in inconsistent,
irreconcilable, and ultimately inequitable results. It was for this
same reason that sovereign immunity was abandoned in Rhode
Island in 1970, with attention shifting away from legal formalism
to focus on the underlying rationale of governmental tort immu-
nity - the protection of the state's discretionary, policy-making
decisions.
To attain that end, alternatives to the public duty doctrine ex-
ist - namely, personal immunities applied to the state, and the
implementation of a discretionary function exception to general
governmental liability. These alternatives are less confusing, pro-
duce more consistent and equitable results, and achieve a better
balance between allowing plaintiffs to recover for the state's tortu-
ous acts and providing absolute governmental immunity because
they protect only the state's discretionary judgments and policy-
based choices. Indeed, plaintiffs must be able to recover for their
injuries consistent with the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act; how-
ever, the state must be protected from liability for its formulation
of policy - not just from monetary damages, but from judicial re-
view as well. This paradigm, although forgotten in Rhode Island,
180. See supra Part III.A.
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is not foreign to it.181 Authority currently exists for a more effec-
tive, predictable, and restrained approach to governmental tort li-
ability, and it should be followed in this State.
Aaron R. Baker 182
181. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943,
953 (R.I. 1991); Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d 328, 332-33 (R.I. 1989); Cal-
houn, 390 A.2d 350, 356 (R.I. 1978).
182. The author would like to thank Professor Richard Brunell for his as-
sistance.
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